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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h).
Introduction

The trial court ruled that Karen M. Lindsey did not acquire an equitable
interest in the business that her husband, Rick J. Lindsey, brought into their
marriage. The court recognized that no facts were in dispute. On appeal, Karen
agrees with that aspect of the trial court's ruling, conceding that Karen's
"contributions to the marriage and efforts to grow [the] business are undisputed"
and arguing only that the "trial court misapplied the undisputed facts to
governing case law." (App. Br. at 9, 11.) For that reason, the only issue on appeal
concerning the trial court's ruling that Karen did not acquire an interest in the
business is whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the undisputed
facts. As demonstrated below, it did.
An underlying issue concerns whether the trial court must hear and
consider all evidence on all issues before ruling Karen had not acquired an
equitable interest in Rick's premarital business interests. All evidence relevant to
that issue was before the court on summary judgment. There was no additional
evidence to consider and nothing improper about the trial court's ruling. The
facts are undisputed, and the court appropriately considered the equities based
upon those undisputed facts. That is what courts do when applying equitable
doctrines on summary judgment.
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In making her equitable argument, Karen fails to mention that, even
though she was not awarded an interest in the business, the court considered
Rick's interest when dividing property and determining alimony. Karen was
awarded $7,300 per month in alimony. She was also awarded a positive $566,545
in the property division, while Rick was awarded a negative $419,880 in the
property division - a difference of $986,425.

It is also worth noting what is not at issue on appeal. Apart from the facts
being undisputed, Karen does not claim an interest in the business by the
commingling of assets. Therefore, the issue is whether, based upon the evidence
presented to the trial court on summary judgment, Karen acquired an interest in
the business, by contribution or the narrow equitable exception.
Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether Karen's claimed contributions during the marriage

augmented, maintained, or protected Rick's separate business interests.
Issue 2: Whether Karen failed to present the trial court with extraordinary

circumstances that would warrant an equitable division of Rick's premarital
business interests including any appreciation or enhancement of the value
during the marriage.
Determinative Provisions

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules that
are determinative of the issues raised on appeal.

2

Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

This appeal arises out of a divorce action and centers on the trial court's
treatment of Rick's premarital insurance business, Prime Holdings Insurance
Services Inc. During the parties' 18 year marriage, Prime Holdings significantly
increased in value.
Rick moved for partial summary judgment asking the trial court to
determine that Rick's premarital business interests in Prime Holdings, together
with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, were his separate property
and not subject to equitable division as marital property.
Karen opposed the motion by asserting that (i) marital income and
proceeds from the sale of Karen's premarital residence had been commingled
with Rick's premarital business interests; (ii) Karen's care for the parties' minor
son and management of the household augmented and enhanced the value of
Prime Holdings; and (iii) equity required Karen be awarded a portion of Rick's
business interests based on her contributions during the marriage.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Rick on the
basis that, based upon the undisputed facts, Rick's business interests were his
premarital separate property and Karen's contributions did not satisfy the test to
warrant a departure from the general rule that a spouse's premarital separate
property and appreciation thereon belongs to that spouse alone.
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2.

Statement of Facts

The parties married in November 1996. (R.1237.) They separated in or
about December 2012. (R.1838.) They have one minor child born as issue of their
marriage. (R.1237.) Both parties had children from prior marriages who were of
minority age during the marriage. (R.1820.)
Rick's Premarital Business Interests

At the time of the parties' marriage, Rick had been employed in the
insurance industry for approximately 17 years, having first begun working in his
father's insurance business in 1979. (R.1237.) After obtainmg his own insurance
brokerage license in 1981, Rick incorporated several insurance companies of his
own over the next fifteen years prior to the marriage of the parties. (R.1237.) At
that time, Rick was the sole owner of a Utah insurance business, Evolution
Insurance Group and its subsidiaries, and owned an 8.1 % interest in a national
insurance company, Prime Holdings (and its subsidiaries). (R.1236-37.)
In November 1997, one year after the parties' marriage, Rick's business
interests in Evolution were merged into Prime Holdings, resulting in Rick's
obtaining a 30% equity interest in Prime Holdings. (R.1236.) As analyzed by
Rick's accounting expert, Brad Townsend, the operation of the entities owned by
Rick did not change in any significant way between the date of the marriage and
the date of the merger. (R.1236.)
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The Undisputed Valuation of Rick's Business Interests
At the time of the merger, Evolution was valued at $3.2 million and Prime
Holdings was valued at $5.2 million. (R.1236.) Prior to the merger, Rick's
business interests were valued at $3.62 million (100% of Evolution at $3.2 million
plus 8.1 % of Prime Holdings at $5.2 million, or $0.42 million). (R.1236.) Postmerger, Prime Holdings was valued in 1997 at between $11.2 million and $13.1
million because of the synergies created by the merged entities. (R.1236.) Based
on these values, Rick's post-merger 30% interest in Prime Holdings was valued
between $3.36 million and $3.93 million, which averages $3.645 million. (R.1236.)
Following a shareholder buyout in 2008, Rick's equity interest in Prime
Holding increased to 59.48% and remained at that percentage until the parties
separated on or near December 31, 2012. (R.1235-36.) As of December 31, 2012,
Rick's 59.48% equity interest was valued between $6 million and $7 million, with
an average value of $6.5 million. (R.1235.) As of December 31, 2013, Prime
Holdings acquired another insurance company, RLI, which acquisition diluted
Rick's interest in Prime Holdings to 47.24 % with an estimated value of
$10,944,000 for his interest. (R.1235.)
As testified to by Mr. Townsend, the value of Rick's business interests
increased from 1997 through June 2014 by $7,324,000, not $7,299,000. 1 (R.123436.) Thus, the internal rate of return on Rick's equity interest in Prime Holdings

Karen incorrectly states that the appreciation on Rick's business interests
was $7.299 million. (App. Br. at 3.)
1
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was 6.93% 2 during the 17 year period between 1997 through June 30, 2014.
(R.1222.) The unchallenged testimony of Mr. Townsend was that such an internal
rate of return is well below the typical rate of return of between 15% to 25%
anticipated for a closely held business. (R.1221.)
The evidence established that Rick received $9,625,623 in wages and other
compensation and $2,123,674 in dividends from Prime Holdings, for a total of
$11,749,297, between 1997 and 2012. (R.1221.) Mr. Townsend testified that this
substantial compensation established that Rick was receiving a significant level
of compensation for his work effort and that he was not leaving earnings in
Prime Holdings to enhance the value of the business. (R.526-27.)
Karen shared in a high standard of living derived from Rick's substantial
income. Mr. Townsend testified that the amount of compensation and dividends
received from Prime Holdings far exceeded the increase in value of Rick's equity
interest in Prime Holdings. (R.526.) In light of the low internal rate of return and
Rick's compensation, the trial court determined that the growth in Rick's equity
interest in Prime Holdings should be attributed to his equity investment at the
time of the merger in 1997, rather than his work effort during the period of 1997
through 2014. (R.1221.)

/.t'Internal rate of return" measures the profitability of investments and is
used to evaluate the desirability of such investments or projects. The higher the
rate of return, the more desirable the investment. (R.1222.)
2
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Karen's Undisputed Relationship to Rick's Business Interests
At the time of and during the parties' marriage, Karen was unemployed.
(R.1227, 1237, 1820.) Karen cared for the parties' one child and performed the
majority of the household duties, such as cleaning, cooking, washing clothes, and
similar activities, although she did have the assistance of a maid. (R.1224.) Karen
cared for her four children from her prior marriage and Rick's two children from
a prior marriage during his statutory parent-time. (R.1882:71-75.)
Karen initially admitted that Rick handled every aspect of the parties'
finances, although she later indicated that she was responsible for paying one
credit card. (R.59, 593, 1223.) Karen was never involved in the acquisition or
development of the parties' real property other than to search for and visit the
parcel on which their Heber City home was constructed, visit other potential
sites, and approve the final floor plan and select furnishings for the parties'
Heber City residence. (R.1223.) Karen was home for the majority of repairs,
deliveries, and installation of HVAC and other appliances at the Heber City
residence. (R.1224.)
Karen had little, if any, involvement with Prime Holdings during the
marriage. Karen was never employed by any of the business entities owned by
Rick during the marriage, had little knowledge of the operations of the
businesses, did not know about the details of Rick's businesses, did not speak
extensively with Rick regarding his businesses, did not know the amount of
Rick's income or the profitability of the businesses, and did not remember
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specifics regarding stock purchases or sales relative to the businesses. (R.1227.)
During the parties' 17 year marriage, Karen recalled entertaining business clients
and associates, with whom Rick had worked since prior to the parties' marriage,
and their families at the parties' marital residence on seven occasions. (R.122427.) Rick, however, performed the majority of the entertainment of business
clients and associates, taking them to locations other than the marital residence.
(R.1224.)
In 2001, Karen received $54,000 from the sale of a residence she jointly
owned with her prior husband, Alan Fitzgerald. (R.1233-34.) Karen claimed that
the proceeds were given to Rick to invest in Prime Holdings, but she presented
no evidence to support her claim. 3 (R.1233.) In response, Rick presented the
testimony of Brent Seegmiller, Prime Holdings' Chief Financial Officer, that after
reviewing the accounting records of Prime Holdings for 2001, there was no
evidence that personal funds of the parties or any related individual were
invested into Prime Holdings or loaned to Prime Holdings. (R.738-39, 1233.) Mr.
Seegmiller further testified that during 2001 no shares of stock were issued to the
parties or any related individual. (R.738-39, 1233.)

Karen states in her brief that Rick told her that money could be used for the
business without new shares being issued. (App. Br. at 11 n.l.) In fact, no such
testimony was provided. Karen testified that she gave the proceeds to Rick but
she could not remember what happened to the proceeds. (R.1233.) She also
testified she had no knowledge of where the proceeds were deposited and that
Rick could have deposited them into his personal account. (R.1233.) She testified
that it was possible she deposited the funds into her own account. (R.1233.)
3

8

Karen also alleged that Rick received stock dividends of 57 shares
("Shares") of Prime Holdings during the marriage and that the shares constitute
marital income that is commmgled with Rick's current ownership interest in
Prime Holdings. 4 (R.1230.) Mr. Seegmiller testified that shareholders of Prime
Holdings could elect to receive a cash dividend or a stock dividend. (R.1103,
1058-61, 1230.) Rick elected to receive the distribution as stock dividends in lieu
of cash dividends. (R.1230.) Mr. Seegmiller further testified that such stock
dividends simply constitute a reclassification from retained earnings to paid-incapital on the balance sheet of Prime Holdings. (R.1103, 1058-61, 1230.) Mr.
Townsend's unchallenged testimony was that the Shares represented a return on
Rick's investment in Prime Holdings and do not, therefore, constitute personal
income earned by Rick during the marriage. (R.1103.) 5
Summary Judgment Record and Ruling

Rick filed for divorce on January 10, 2013, in the Fourth Judicial District
Court for Wasatch County, Utah. (R.1-6.) On February 18, 2014, Rick filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R.482-530.) In support, Rick filed the
Declaration of Brad Townsend, Rick's expert, providing his opinions as to the
Karen also argued to the trial court that Prime Holdings benefited from
acquiring a Draper residence purchased by the parties during the marriage.
(R.534-52; 985-97.). She has not raised that issue on appeal.
5 In opposing the summary judgment motion, Karen argued that Prime
Holdings' assuming the mortgage of the parties' residence in Draper, Utah in
2009 constituted a commingling of marital income with Rick's premarital
business interests. (R.536-37, 987-88.) However, Karen does not raise the claim on
appeal.
4
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value of Rick's business interests in Prime Holdings at the time of the marriage
and the time of separation. (R.522-30.)
Rick argued that his premarital business interests, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value, should be awarded to him as his
separate property because the undisputed facts established (i) the business
interests were never commingled with the marital estate, (ii) Karen never
actively participated or contributed in any material way to enhance, maintain, or
protect the value of Prime Holdings, and (iii) there were no extraordinary
circumstances warranting an equitable division of his separate property and any
appreciation thereon. (R.483-500.)
Karen moved for a continuance under rule 56(£) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, requesting that the trial court defer consideration of the summary
judgment motion until discovery could be completed on the issues raised
therein. (R.531-33.) The trial court reserved ruling to provide Karen's expert,
Cory Kennedy, an opportunity to determine whether further expert testimony
would be necessary relative to Mr. Townsend's opinions, particularly his
valuation of Prime Holdings. (R.927-30.)
At a hearing on the rule 56(£) motion, Karen stipulated to the values of
Prime Holdings as of the marriage date and separation date as prepared by Mr.
Townsend with an update to be done as to the valuation as of June 30, 2014.
(R.951.) The trial court ordered that further discovery could be conducted
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through October 7, 2014. (R.951.) The trial court then set a supplemental briefing
schedule and a hearing. (R.951, 981.)
At the close of fact discovery, Karen filed a Supplemental Opposition to
Rick's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R.985-97.) Rick filed a reply
memorandum, along with the supporting Second Supplemental Declaration of
Brad Townsend. (R.1022-1107.) This included the updated business valuation.
(R.1022-1107.)
After a hearing, the trial court awarded Rick, as his separate property, his
47.24 % fully diluted equity interest in Prime Holdings, which constituted his
premarital business interests together with any appreciation or enhancement
thereon. (R.1240-42.) The trial court explained its reasoning in a ruling entered on
November 17, 2014. (R.1220-42.)
In granting partial summary judgment, the trial court determined that
Karen presented no evidence that Rick's premarital business interests had been
commingled with Karen's separate property or marital property. (R.1229-34.)
~

Specifically, the trial court concluded that (i) there was no evidence to support
Karen's allegation that proceeds she received from the sale of her premarital
residence were invested in or loaned to Prime Holdings (R.1233); (ii) the
undisputed evidence established there to be no equity in the parties' marital
residence in Draper, Utah, at the time Prime Holdings assumed the mortgage
encumbering that residence in 2009 (R.1231); and (iii) the undisputed evidence
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established that the stock dividends received by Rick during the marriage
represented a return on Rick's investment in Prime Holdings and did not
constitute personal income earned by Rick during the marriage. (R.1229.)
The trial court further concluded that the undisputed facts established that
Karen was not involved in the operation of Rick's business interests, as her
assistance in entertaining business clients was infrequent and such assistance had
no material impact that augmented or enhanced the value of Rick's business
interests. (R.1223.) The trial court further concluded that the undisputed facts did
not establish that Karen had assumed an increased workload in the home or in
managing the financial affairs or assets of the parties, thereby freeing up Rick to
devote more time to his business interests. (R.1223.) Thus, the trial court
concluded that Karen's contributions were insufficient to rise to the level of
contributions needed to conclude that she had augmented or enhanced the value
of Rick's business interests. (R.1223.) Finally, the court recognized that, based on
the low rate of return on Rick's equity in the business, Rick did not retain
earnings in Prime Holdings to expand the business. (R.1221.)
Six weeks later, a trial was held on the disputed issues of support and
marital property division. (R.1881-82.) Karen reasserted her claim that her
premarital funds had been commingled with Rick's business interests in Prime
Holdings, but she presented no new testimony or evidence relative to her
contributions during the marriage, the alleged investment of Karen's premarital
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funds in Prime Holdings, and any alleged marital income that had been invested
in Prime Holdings. (R.1882:64-163.) Nor does she appeal the commingling issue.
On August 13, 2015, the trial court entered Amended and Restated
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R.1770-1839.) The trial court
determined, in relevant part, that (i) no new evidence was presented at trial
warranting reconsideration of the summary judgment; (ii) each party testified
that he or she did not know where Karen's proceeds from the sale of her
premarital residence were deposited or how the proceeds were used, the
proceeds had lost their separate character having been commingled with marital
funds and ultimately consumed; and (iii) Karen's efforts during the marriage
have been compensated by her enjoying the benefits of Rick's salary, bonus, and
other perquisites. (R.1770-1839.)
Independent of the value of the business, the parties enjoyed a high
standard of living during the marriage based on Rick's compensation of over
$11,000,000 from Prime Holdings. Karen was awarded alimony in the amount of
la>

$7,300 per month. (R.1801.) But the total value of the parties' marital estate was
only $146,665. (R.1221, 1780.) From that, the trial court awarded Karen $566,527 the value of two vehicles, certain personal property, retirement, and portion of a
judgment awarded to Rick -and awarded Rick some property but substantial
debt of the marital estate: a negative value of ($419,862). (R.1776.)
Karen appealed. (R.1871-72.)

13

Summary of the Argument

The trial court awarded Rick, on summary judgment, his interest in Prime
Holdings, together with any appreciation or enhancement thereon, on the
grounds that it was separate, premarital property. On appeal, Karen does not
assert that the trial court erred because there were disputed issues of fact. Nor
could she. The facts were undisputed, and the issue was and is whether those
undisputed facts entitled Karen to an interest in the business.
Generally, premarital property, together with its appreciation, is awarded
to the spouse who brought the property into the marriage unless the owner
spouse has commingled it with the marital estate; the nonowner spouse has
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property; or
other extraordinary situations exist where equity warrants a deviation from the
presumptive rule. None of those circumstances are present here.
Commingling is not at issue on appeal. As to contribution, this court
requires active participation and contribution by the nonowner spouse, through
such means as working for the business without pay; contributing one's income
to the marriage while the other spouse's income is used to enhance the value of
the separate property; quitting a job to assume sole responsibility of running the
household and managing household accounts while the other spouse worked; or
managing and enhancing the value of the parties' marital property.
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Karen did none of those. It was undisputed that Karen never worked for
any of Rick's business entities nor did she have any involvement in the business.
Rick agrees that Karen remained at home to focus on caring for the parties' child
and managing the maintenance and upkeep of the household. It was undisputed
that Rick handled all aspects of the parties' finances during the marriage except
for one credit card, which Karen paid. It is also undisputed that no earnings of
Prime Holdings were retained in the business to expand the business. Karen
presented no evidence to establish that the value of Rick's premarital business or
appreciation thereon can be attributed to her efforts. The trial court therefore
correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that Karen did not contribute to Rick's
premarital separate property such that she should be awarded a portion of it.
As to the narrow equitable exception, Karen argues that the court should
have considered more evidence on issues other than the rate of return on Rick's
interest in the business. If that were true, it was Karen's responsibility to present
the court with that evidence at the summary judgment stage. But it is not true.
The court properly applied the equitable exception to the facts of this case and
rejected Karen's arguments. The court did, however, consider Rick's interest in
the business when it employed equitable principles in awarding alimony and
dividing marital assets. The court awarded Karen $7,300 per month in alimony
and a positive value of marital property of $566,545 and awarded Rick a negative
value of marital property of $419,862. The court did not err.

15

Argument

Karen has appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment that
awarded to Rick the interest in the business he brought into the marriage.
II

Granting summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
II

of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). A summary judgment movant must affirmatively
provide factual evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact." Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, iJ 6, 211 P.3d 987.
11

Although upon summary judgment the court must view all facts and

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, it may not assume facts for which no
evidence is offered. Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient
basis for opposing summary judgment." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,

iJ 20, 48 P.3d 941 (internal quotation marks omitted). The non-moving party must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court correctly applied these standards after allowing Karen
additional discovery to create a complete summary judgment record. Karen
provided evidence that was legally insufficient to establish her interest in the
business. For that reason, the trial court did not err in awarding the interest in
the business to Rick.

16
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1.

The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment inf avor of Rick
because the Undisputed Facts Showed that Karen Had Not Augmented
or Enhanced Rick's Separate Property

The trial court correctly followed and applied well-established Utah law
when it awarded Rick his premarital business interests in Prime Holdings,
together with any appreciation and enhancement thereon. Under Utah law,
"marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses
and separate property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or
similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." Stonehocker v.

Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ,r 13, 176 P.3d 476 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Premarital property "may be viewed as separate property, and the
spouse bringing such separate property into the marriage may retain it following
the marriage." Keiter v. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ,r 22, 235 P.3d 782 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Said differently, "trial courts making 'equitable'
property division should generally award property acquired by one spouse by
gift and inheritance during the marriage ... to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value." Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ,r 10,
203 P.3d 1020 (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
To reach this result, a trial court must first properly categorize property as
marital or separate when distributing property. Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79,

,r 121,

--- P.3d ---. "It is only after this initial characterization that the trial court can
continue in making its property distributions." Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App
263,

,r 33, 190 P.3d 497. "Trial courts must follow this systematic approach when
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making property division determinations." Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App 394,

,r 5, 174 P.3d 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted).
O

But separate property is not totally beyond a court's reach in an equitable
property division." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ,r 19, 45 P.3d 176 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). Courts have allowed a nonowner
spouse to receive an equitable portion of the owner spouse's separate property
where the owner spouse has commingled the asset; the nonowner spouse has
materially contributed or enhanced the value of the asset; or where equity so
requires. Keiter, 2010 UT App 169, ,r 22; Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308
(Utah 1988); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.~d 1314, 1318 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Karen has
not asserted on app~al that Rick commingled his bus~ess interest. The two
questions at issue are whether she, the nonownet spouse, materially contributed
or enhanced the value of the asset, and whether equity required that she be given
a share of Rick's business. As described below, the trial court correctly ruled that
neither exception applied, and instead, the general rule that the owner spouse
(Rick) was entitled to all of his separate property would control.
1.1

This Court Has Explained What Is Necessary to Cross the
"Contribution Theory" Threshold
II

As to the contribution category," Utah courts have long held distribution
II

of one spouse's separate property to the other may be appropriate if the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement,
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maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable
interest in it." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1988).
This court has clarified that "active participation and contribution by the
nonowner spouse" is required "in order to qualify under the contribution
category of Mortensen. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ,r 14. More recently in Dahl, the
11

Utah Supreme Court explained that trial courts should "look to a party's actions
as a manifestation of a spouse's intent to contribute separate property to the
marital estate." 2015 UT 79,

,r 143.

For example, in Elman, the wife never worked in the husband's business
but was found to have held "unusual" responsibilities in the marriage. 2002 UT
App 83, ,r 24. In that case, the husband ~ad quit his regular employment during
the marriage to focus on developing his family's business. Id. Meanwhile, the
wife had left her private sector employment to actively manage the household
and take on additional responsibilities at home including securing the land for
and overseeing the building of the parties' marital residence and assisting in the
acquisition of a Montana ranch. Id. These real properties significantly increased
in value during the marriage due to the wife's ongoing efforts. Id. Because the
wife had helped enhance the value of the marital properties, a value that the
husband obviously would receive benefit from in the division of marital
property, it was equitable that she also share in the appreciation in the value of
his premarital family business. Id.
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Similarly, in Henshaw v. Henshaw, the wife's contributions toward the
"preservation and maintenance" of the husband's separate property were found
to "adequately support[]" an award of such property to the wife where the wife
worked the entire marriage and contributed all of her income toward the
marriage while the husband earned limited income to support the family by
working on a ranch and renting apartments he had purchased from gifted
money. 2012 UT App 56,

,r,r 1_7-18, 271 P.3d 837.

In Dunn, the wife "performed bookkeeping and secretarial services
without pay for [her husband's] corporation" and the corporation "was founded
and operated through the joint efforts and joint sacrifices of the parties." 802 P.2d
at 1318. She had sole responsibility not orµy of running the marital ho:usehold
but of managing the household accounts, which allowed her husband to focus
solely on his business. Id. This court concluded "she was his partner in the
'business' of marriage and her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth
of his practice and the business." Id.; see also Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 305,309.
On the other hand, in Jensen, this court held that the wife's efforts were not
adequate to justify an award of equity in the husband's premarital business. 2009
UT App 1, ,r 16. In that case, the wife cared for the parties' one child, maintained
the household, and contributed some income from her own massage therapy
business. Id.

,r 3. But this court held, "Wife behaved in a very normal and

commendable manner by caring for the parties' child, maintaining the
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~

household, and running her own part-time business from their home. More is
required, however, to justify an award of Husband's separate property." Id.

,r 16.

Likewise in Kunzler, this court found the wife's limited role in maintaining
the marital household, which enabled the husband to work for longer stretches
of time away from the home, was also held to be insufficient to rise to the level of
contributions present in Elman and Dunn. 2008 UT App 263, ,r 19. This court
wrote, "at trial Wife testified only as to how her domestic labors enabled
Husband to ranch for longer periods of time without having to, for example,
return home to launder his clothes." Id. This court held that such activity did not
support the conclusion that she had augmented or enhanced the value of her
husband's separate .property. Id.
1.2

Karen's Efforts During the Marriage Did Not Cross the
Contribution Threshold By Augmenting or Enhancing Rick's
Premarital Business and Were Insufficient to Create an Equitable
Interest in the Appreciation and Growth of Rick's Premarital
Business

The facts as to Karen's contributions to the marriage and Rick's business
interests in Prime Holdings are undisputed. (App. Br. at 11 (indicating that Facts
8-17 of Appellant's brief are undisputed)). The only question is whether those
facts satisfy the legal standard set forth in the above cases.
Karen admits her contributions during the marriage do not rise to the level
of the facts described in Elman. (App. Br. at 14.) But she asserts that her
involvement in the household is more like that of the wives in Dunn and
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Henshaw, and not like the wives' involvement in Jensen and Kunzler. 6 The trial
court was correct to reject these assertions.
Karen failed to provide evidence that, under the parameters described in
the case law, her efforts augmented or enhanced the value of Rick's premarital
business interests. She did not provide evidence that she did the sorts of things
that amount to "augmenting" or "enhancing" business interests, such as (i)
working for the business without pay; (ii) working the entire marriage and
contributing all of her income toward the marriage while the husband's income
was used to enhance the value of the business; (iii) quitting a job _to assume sole
resp~nsibility of running the household an~ ffi:anaging household accounts while
the husband worked, or (iv) managing and enhancing the value of the parties'
marital property.
Instead, the undisputed facts establish none of these circumstances. Each
circumstance is addressed in turn.
First, Karen presented no evidence that she performed any labor during
the marriage to enhance or maintain Rick's premarital business interests.
(R.1227.) To the contrary, she admitted she had no involvement with Rick's
Karen also refers to cases predating Mortensen, which had a lower threshold.
(App. Br. at 16-17 (citing Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983)). But
Karen concedes that post-Mortensen case law "has drifted from th[at] more liberal
standard." (Id.) This court has made clear that, since the time of Mortensen, the
law "require[s] more active participation and contribution by the nonowner
spouse in order to qualify under the contribution category of Mortensen." Jensen,
2009 UT App 1, ,r 14.
6
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insurance business prior to or during the 1narriage. (R.1227.) She was never
employed by any of the business entities owned by Rick during the marriage.

(R.1227.) Karen acknowledged she had no knowledge of how interests in the
business were held, business operations, merger of business entities, redemption
of stock, business litigation, the profitability of the businesses, any fluctuation in
income or earnings, or any loss or decline in market value. (R.1227.) She
admitted she was not involved in any business related discussions with Rick.

(R.1227.) While Karen entertained six of Rick's business associates on seven
occasions over the seventeen years, the associates were co1:1ducting business with
Rick prior to the marriage. (R.1224.) Karen presented no evidence she entertained
potential or new clients or business associates. Karen did not dispute that Rick
handled the vast majority of entertaining his business clients and associates~

(R.1224.) Nor did she dispute that Rick entertained clients at locations other than
the marital residence and at his ranch in Uintah County. (R.1224.)
Second, Karen presented no evidence that she had taken on any unusual
responsibilities in the marriage that enhanced the value of the parties' marital
assets. Karen was primarily responsible for the care of the parties' minor son.

(R.1224.) She was responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the parties'
residences, although she had the assistance of a maid. (R.1224.) She was present
during the majority of deliveries to and repairs made to the parties' Heber City
residence. (R.1224.) Karen originally testified that she left all aspects of the

23

parties' finances to Rick but later modified her statement by claiming she was
responsible for paying one credit card. (R.59, 593, 1223-24.) Karen indicates in her
brief that she cared for Rick's two children from a prior marriage during his
parent-time, (App. Br. at 15) but she did not provide any details as to what that
entailed when responding to the summary judgment motion. (R.537, 989.) In
short, Karen did not perform any extraordinary duties.
Third, Karen presented no evidence to establish how her contributions
enhanced the value of the parties' real properties during the marriage as
required under Elman. By her own admission, Karen had a limited role in the
acquisition, development, and maintenance of the parties' real properties. (R.59293, 1223.) The value of the parties' marital estate significantly decreased during
the marriage. For example, it was undisputed at trial that the parties had spent
approximately $7,000,000 to build and furnish the Heber City residence but the
marital residence had a negative equity in the amount of ($1,045,619) as of
September 30, 2014. (R.1795, 1881:83.) Despite Rick having earned more than
$11,000,000 during the marriage, the value of the parties' marital estate was only
$146,665 at the time of trial. (R.1221, 1780.)
Finally, Karen failed to present sufficient evidence demonstrating an
"active participation with or contribution to" the growth of Rick's premarital
business interests entitling her to an equitable claim against a portion of those
business interests, including appreciation. (R.1223-27.) As stated above, Karen
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had no involvement in the operation of the business and only infrequently
entertained longstanding business associates of Rick. (R.1227.) In short, she did
not establish that her contributions materially augmented or enhanced the value
of Rick's business interests. (R.1224-27.) She presented no evidence to establish
she had taken on any extraordinary increased workload in the home or in
managing the financial affairs or assets of the parties, thereby allowing Rick to
direct more time to his business interests.
In sum, the undisputed facts do not satisfy the test. Karen did not present
evidence to show her efforts rose to the level of" active contributions" of a
spouse _who would be entitled to an equitable claim on the other spouse's
separate property. The trial court was correct when it concluded that Karen had
not shown that she was entitled to a portion of Rick's separate property.
It is worth noting, however, that Karen's contributions were recognized

and rewarded by the trial court in other ways in its final division of property.
Karen was awarded marital property with a positive value of $566,545 while
Rick received property and debt with a negative value of ($419,880). (R.1776.)
The trial court burdened Rick with marital debt. The trial court addressed
Karen's equity argument by awarding marital property and debt between the
parties with an approximate $1,000,000 differential as to value. Karen was also
awarded alimony in the amount of $7,300 per month after the trial court
considered the factors under Utah statutory and case law.
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2.

The Undisputed Facts Reveal No Extraordinary Circumstances to
Warrant an Equitable Claim in Rick's Premarital Business

The trial court also ruled that Karen was not entitled to any of Rick's
separate property under an equity exception. "Utah has a long-established policy
in favor of the equitable distribution of property in divorce cases." CFO Payson,

LLC v. Christensen, 2015 UT App 251, ,r 10 n.2, 361 P.3d 145. "In most cases,
equity requires that each party retain the separate property that he or she
brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property."

Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ,r 28, 351 P.3d 90 (quoting Dunn v. Dunn, 802
P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). But "the court must consider whether
there are any e~traordinary circumstances that warrant a departure from ~e
presumptive rule." Henshaw V; Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ,r 15, 271 P.3d 837.
This court has stated the overriding consideration is that the ultimate
division be equitable. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even so, an
equitable distribution "does not need to be divided with strict mathematical
equality," Christian v. Christian, 2014 UT App 283,

,r 12, 341 P.3d 254, "since a fair

and equitable property distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution,"

Clarke v. Clarke, 2012 UT App 328, ,r 9, 292 P.3d 76 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And it is important to note that a trial court should not deprive a
spouse who owns separate property of the benefit of that separate property by
awarding a disproportionate share of the marital property in order to offset the
separate property award. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308.
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In Elman v. Elman, this court affirmed that, with respect to premarital
businesses, a spouse should be entitled to a reasonable rate of return on his
premarital investment before quantifying or concluding the increase in value
created during the marriage is deemed to be marital. 2002 UT App 83,

,r,r 20, 29, 45 P.3d 176. The court affirmed the trial court's method of calculating
marital appreciation by subtracting a reasonable rate of return of 10% on the
husband's premarital partnership interests and only categorizing the growth
above the reasonable rate of return as marital. Id. In other words, under Elman, a
party should be allowed a reasonable return on his premarital capital investment
before concluding the increase in value was creat~d personally, and a percentage
of 10% was found to be reasonable.
Rick's annual return on his premarital equity was less than 7%. It is
undisputed that at the time of the merger in 1997, the total value of Rick's
business was valued at $3.62 million. (R.1236.) It is also undisputed that as of
December 31, 2012, Rick's 59.48% equity interest in Prime Holdings was worth
VSP

between $6 million and $7 million with a reasonable mid-point estimate of $6.5
million. (R.1235.) On December 31, 2013, Rick's interest in Prime Holdings
decreased from 59.48% to 47.24%. (R.1235.) As of June 30, 2014, Rick's 47.24%
fully-diluted equity interest was worth $10,944,000. (R.1235.) And between 1997
through 2012, Rick received $9,625,623 in wages as compensation and $2,123,674
in dividends from Prime Holdings, for a total of $11,749,297. (R.1221.)
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Mr. Townsend testified that the internal rate of return on Rick's business
interests increased 6.93% during the period between 1997 and June 30, 2014.
(R.1221-22.) According to Mr. Townsend, such an internal rate of return is well
below the anticipated rate of return of between 15% to 25% for a closely held
business. (R.1221-22.) Mr. Townsend further testified that in light of the low rate
of return, the growth in Rick's equity interest in Prime Holdings should be
attributed to his equity investment at the time of the merger in 1997, rather than
his work effort during the period between 1997 and 2012. (R.1221.) This is
particularly true in light of the significant amounts of salary and dividends Rick
received fro!? the business that decreased the value_ of ~rime f:Iol~ings. (R.1221.).

In other words, during the marriage, the marital estate benefitted more from
Rick's work efforts than Prime Holdings. (R.1221.)
Karen presented no evidence to dispute Mr. Townsend's testimony.
(R.1221.) The trial court correctly considered the rate of return when making its
determination that there are no extraordinary circumstances justifying a
deviation from the presumptive rule.
Karen quotes Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
to assert that the trial court was required to consider" all of the pertinent
circumstances" when "fashioning an equitable property division." (App. Br. at
19.) Those circumstances include "the amount and kind of property to be
divided, the source of the property, the parties' heal th, the parties' standard of
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living and respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities, the
duration of the marriage, what the parties gave up by the marriage, and the
relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony awarded."

Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1147. However, this is not the applicable standard. This court
has since clarified that the standard is "whether there are any extraordinary
circumstances that warrant a departure from the presumptive rule." Henshaw,
2012 UT App 56,

,r 15.

Karen complains that the trial court" did not make findings relative" to the

Naranjo factors. But Karen did not, at summary judgment, and does not, on
appeal, pre~ent any evidence to support her claims that e~traordinary
circumstances exist warranting that she be awarded an equitable interest in
Rick's premarital business.
Instead, she complains that "the h·ial court should have heard all equitable
issues more fully at trial" so that the trial court could" observe the parties'
demeanor, hear all the evidence, etc." (App. Br. at 21.) She asserts that she
"should be provided the opportunity to argue at trial how the 'ultimate division'
is most equitable." (Id.) As "illustrations," she contends that the trial court should
have heard more about the $54,000 she received from her first divorce and the 57
shares in the business that Rick received instead of cash. (App. Br. at 21-22.)
But Karen's argument does not defeat a summary judgment motion
because she has provided no facts to show that anything was incomplete from the
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summary judgment record. Discovery was complete. It was Karen's obligation to
provide the court with whatever evidence she considered relevant to the narrow
equitable exception. Paget v. Dep't of Transp., 2014 UT App 62,

,r 2,322 P.3d 1180

(holding that summary judgment was correct where there was no conflicting
evidence and the time for discovery had passed). She did not do so at trial and
has not done so on appeal. She cannot now complain that the court failed to
consider evidence she did not provide. Even were she correct that the summary
judgment record was incomplete, that would not be a reason to reverse.
Perhaps more important, the trial court's analysis did not stop at its
conc_lusion that the reasonably a~ticipated market rate of return was higher than
Rick's actual rate of return. The trial-court considered Mr. Townsend's testimony
regarding Rick's earnings during the marriage and determined Rick received a
level of compensation commensurate with his work effort. (R.1221.) It was
undisputed that Rick did not retain earnings in Prime Holdings for purposes of
enhancing the value of the business, but instead took compensation and
dividends in the amount of $11,749,297, from which Karen benefited. (Id.)
And because Karen points only to small contributions, at best, the
equitable exception would have done her no good in the end. Ultimately, Karen
was compensated for her contributions to the marriage and given a significant
share of the overall assets when the trial court made its final decisions regarding
alimony and division of marital property. Karen was awarded $7,300 per month
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in alimony and was awarded marital property with a positive value of $566,545

while Rick received marital debt with a negative value of ($419,880). (R.1776.)
Thus, the equities were considered and resolved in Karen's favor.
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm. But if this court
reverses, it should reopen all issues that concern the equitable division of
property, including the division of marital property and alimony.
DATED this 15 th day of April, 2016.
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